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Public School Desegregation: Legal
Remedies for De Facto
Segregation*
J. Skelly Wright
( NE HUNDRED YEARS ago this country abolished slavery
and decreed by solemn constitutonal amendment that "all
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside."' Thus, at last, our Negro citizens were
included in the truths we hold self-evident, "that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and theTHE AUTHOR (Ph.B., LL.B., Loyola Un- pursuit of Happiess. ' '2
versity at New Orleans, Louisiana) is a p pp
Judge of the United States Court of Ap- One hundred years have
peals for the District of Columbia Cir- passed and the promise of
cuit.
equality remains, in large part,
unfulfilled. It seems that in
these 100 years we have succeeded in changing a system of slavery
into a caste system based on race which may, in some respects, be
more difficult to uproot than slavery itself.
Before considering the problem of racial discrimination as it
confronts this country today, it may be useful briefly to recall how
the great hopes and aspirations of 100 years ago were curdled in
the aftermath of the Civil War. And it will be particularly inter-
esting to note that the instrument of destruction then - the United
States Supreme Court - is now the architect of the new dream of
equality and freedom.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Post Civil War Period
Immediately following the close of the Civil War, Congress
set about the task of insuring, insofar as possible by law, that the
* This article includes a substantial portion of the Sixth Annual James Madison Lec-
ture delivered on February 17, 1965, which is copyrighted by New York University.
The entire text of the Lecture appears at 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 285 (1965).
1. U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776)
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rights of the new citizens would be respected. First it considered
for enactment a series of civil rights laws. Then, when it became
concerned that the Supreme Court might declare them unconsti-
tutional, it proceeded to initiate constitutional amendments which
embedded Negro rights in our basic law. The Implementation of
these amendments followed quickly in the form of the Civil Rights
Acts.'
The congressional concern about the post Civil War Supreme
Court was not unwarranted. Nor did the thirteenth, fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments succeed in protecting the civil rights
legislation from the destructive arm of the Court. In a series of
decisions, by a restrictive reading of these amendments, partcularlv
the fourteenth, the Supreme Court made a shambles of the Civil
Rights Acts. Statutes protecting the voting rights of Negroes,4 out-
lawing the Ku Klux Klan,5 insuring Negro access to public accom-
modations,' and others, were all declared unconstitutional.
Hardly more than a decade after the dose of the Civil War,
the moral fervor which had supported the recognition of Negro
rights was ebbing fast. Discouraged by the action of the Supreme
Court, and with this country undergoing an industrial revolution,
the great mass of the people turned their attention to more mun-
dane matters. The climate of the times was such that in 1877,
after his opponent, Samuel J. Tilden, had won the election for the
Presidency by over a quarter of a million votes, the followers of Ruth-
erford B. Hayes were able to make a cynical political deal with the
Tilden electors in five Southern states. These states agreed to cast
their votes for Hayes, making him President, in return for which
the Hayes forces agreed to, and did, end the protection which the
federal government had afforded the Negro in the South since the
Civil War.
7
Not long after Hayes had assumed the Presidency, segregation
laws cautiously began to make their appearances in the states of
the old Confederacy. As a substitute for slavery, the Negro was
subject to isolation from the main stream of public life by criminal
3. See generally Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? 2 STAN. L REV. 5 (1949); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights
Legsslatton, 50 MICE. L REV. 1323 (1952).
4. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S.
214 (1875).
5. United States v. Hams, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
6. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
7. WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACrION Passm (2d ed. 1956).
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statutes. Initially, not even the proponents of these laws had con-
fidence in their constitutionality. Enforcement was tentative and
usually withdrawn when challenged. Finally, in 1896, a test of
a Louisiana statute8 which made it a crime for a Negro to invade
the public accommodation on a train reserved for whites reached the
Supreme Court. Eight Justices of the Supreme Court m that case,
Plessy v. Ferguson,' were able to hold that racial segregation, com-
pelled by law, was legal. However, one lone member of the Court,
the first Mr. Justice Harlan, delivered the most powerful dissent in
the annals of jurisprudence. It reads in part:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education,
in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for
all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to
the principles of constitutional liberty. But in view of the Consti-
tution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal
before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful.
The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surround-
ings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the
supreme law of the land are involved. It is, therefore, to be re-
gretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the funda-
mental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is
competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of
their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time,
prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tri-
bunal in the Dred Scott case.
If evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon
public highways established for the benefit of all, they will be in-
finitely less than those that will surely come from state legislation
regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race.
We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other
peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of
the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degra-
dation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before
the law. The thin disguise of "equal" accommodations for pas-
sengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for
the wrong this day done.' 0
Racial segregation, having received the benediction of the
Supreme Court, spread like a prairie fire through the Southland.
8. La. Acts 1890, No. 111, at 152.
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
10. Id. at 559, 562.
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Literally hundreds of statutes were passed requiring segregation
from the cradle into the grave" - all under pain of imprisonment
for violations. The segregation laws were such a success that the
legislatures in the Southern states soon turned their attention to dis-
enfranchismg the Negro. By the use of grandfather clauses and
understanding tests in registration statutes, the registration rolls
in practically all of the states of the Confederacy were purged of
Negro voters. In Louisiana, for example, over 99 per cent of the
Negro voters lost their right to vote. Over 130,000 Negroes in
Louisiana alone, one-half of the total registration, were scratched
from the voting rolls.' Thus, while compelling segregation by
law, appropriate steps were taken to insure that the law was not
changed.
For almost fifty years from the turn of the century public apathy
toward the plight of the Negro continued. During this time the
Negro remained in a state of limbo - half slave and half free. And
during this time the politically defenseless and segregated Negro
was subjected to 1,780 known lynchings."3
B. Assault on the Wall of Segregation
After World War II, during which he fought side by side
with his white brothers-in-arms, public attention again began to
be focused on the plight of the Negro. Guilt feelings were be-
coming more difficult to suppress. The Supreme Court, now lead-
ing the fight for recognition of the Negro's right to full citizenship,
began an assault on the wall of segregation. In a series of decisions
the Court gradually made it clear that the separate but equal
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson set an unacceptable standard for
determining equal protection under the law. And, finally, in the
historic Brown v. Board of Educ. opinion, the Chief Justice, speak-
mg for a unanimous Court, held that "separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal."' 4
Once "separate but equal" was outlawed as a constitutional
test in the field of educational facilities, the Court had no difficulty
11. For the citations of many of these statutes, see Supplemental Brief for the United
States as Anmcus Curiae, pp. 50-63, Boule v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Barr
v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964)
12. WOODWARD, Tim STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 68 (1955).
13. Hearng on H.R. 41, H.R. 57, H.R. 77, H.R. 223, H.R. 228, H.R. 278, and H.R.
800 Before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Commattee.on the Judiciary, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 39 (1948).
14. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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in applying the new principle to other areas in which segregation
compelled by law had resulted in a caste system adversely affecting
the Negro. State statutes requiring racial segregation in transporta-
tion facilities,'" parks," playgrounds, 7 hospitals," and other public
places 9 have all been declared unconstitutional, so that now the last
vestiges of the iniquitous separate but equal doctrine have been ex-
punged from the law But as we have learned from our experience
under the post-Civil War constitutional amendments, it is one thing
solemnly to declare the legal rights of Negroes, and yet quite an-
other to make recognition of those rights a reality Ten years have
passed since the Supreme Court's historic pronouncement in Brown
v Board of Educ. and, while the border states generally have sought
to comply with its mandates, in most of the states of the old Con-
federacy compliance, if any, has been, at best, grudging. The
simple truth is that, in most of these states, integration of the public
schools ten years after Brown is less than one per cent effective.
The 1964 Staff Report on Public Education submitted to the
United States Commission on Civil Rights discloses that in seven
states in the former Confederacy, 499 of every 500 Negro pupils
attend 100 per cent Negro schools.2" Less than one Negro pupil
in 500 attend desegregated schools, and then only on a token basis.
Based on the progress in desegregation made the first ten years
after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Brown, many
more years may be required before the segregated Negro school is
eliminated from the deep South.
Progress in desegregation can be accelerated, however, if courts
refuse to countenance gerrymandering as a substitute for segregation
compelled by law. It is becoming increasingly clear that as South-
ern school boards change from a dual, i.e., separate Negro and
white, operation to a single school system, segregation in the schools
can remain virtually as before. By careful drawing of neighbor-
hood school boundary lines, the formerly all-white school remains
15. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam), affirming 142 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.
Ala. 1956)
16. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (per curiam),
affirming 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958)
17 Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963)
18. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
19. See Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per cursam); Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
20. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1964 STAFF REPORT ON PUBLIc EDUCA-
TION 290-91.
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all white, or almost so, and the formerly all-Negro school remains,
for all intents and purposes, all Negro. The fact that the segrega-
tion is no longer in terms compelled by law does not eliminate the
discrimnation or remedy the inequality. Thus, the interdiction of
all state statutes compelling racial segregation in public schools is
but a short first step on the road to desegregation.
Desegregation in the South may also be accelerated by energetic
and effective use of the powers granted the Attorney General under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under section 40721 of that act,
the Attorney General may initiate suits in behalf of individuals and
ask the district courts to end racial segregation in the public schools,
at least where the segregation results from the deliberate act of
state officials pursuant to state statute or discriminatory purpose of
their own. It is by no means- certain, however, that the Attorney
General will be any more successful than the NAACP in aclueving
actual rather than token desegregation. The difficulties inherent
in achieving true desegregation are so great, as ten years of ex-
perience testify, and the defenses available to school boards resisting
every step of the way so many, that only an alert and conscientious
continuous effort on the part of both the executive and judicial
branches of our government, plus a compelling desire on the part
of Negroes generally, can make section 407 of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act an effective instrument in bringing reality to desegre-
gation in the public schools in the deep South.
II. THE SocIo-EcoNOMIc CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM
The obstacles to further integration forecast for the South,
once the illegality of de lure segregation is accepted, are already
being encountered in other parts of the country. De facto racial
segregation infects the public school systems in most urban areas
of the North and West. This de facto segregation has its genesis
in a combination of conditions, the combination varying from city
to city, sometimes from neighborhood to neighborhood in the
same city. Historical gerrymandering is a common cause of de
facto segregation; restrictive covenants in land titles segregating
neighborhoods is another common cause. But more and more it is
becoming apparent that perhaps the primary cause of de facto segre-
gation in urban schools is the socio-economic condition of the Negro.
The inability of many Negroes, because of overt and covert job
discrimination, to find proper employment drives them and their
21. 78 Stat. 248 (1964).
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families into the segregated slums which disgrace many of our
metropolitan areas.
A. Inherently Infertor Schools
It is clear from the Supreme Court in Brown,22 from the various
state authorities that have considered the problem, 3 and from the
historical background of slavery and the continuing discrimination
against the Negro citizen that a segregated Negro school, whether
in the North or in the South, is inherently unequal to its white coun-
terpart. In additAon to the damage done by segregated education to
the minds and hearts and ability of Negro children to learn, segre-
gation in public schools, for whatever reason, brands them as in-
ferior - in their own minds and in the public mind. The un-
fortunate fact is that in contemporary America race and color are
associated with status distinctions among groups of human beings.
The public schools reflect this larger social fact in that the propor-
tion of Negroes and whites in a given school is often associated
with the status of the school The educational quality and per-
formance to be expected from that school are frequently expressed
in terms of the racial complexion and general status assigned to
the school. It is well recognized that in most cases a school en-
rolling a large proportion of Negro students is viewed as a lower
status school.24
Experience with segregated Negro schools, in the North as
well as the South, confirms the public impression that Negro
schools, in addition to being per se inferior, are usually demon-
strably inferior in fact. Surveys of school systems throughout the
country demonstrate time and again that the Negro school, as
compared with its white counterpart, is overcrowded and under-
staffed - usually with inferior teachers. The experienced teachers
with a choice of assignment avoid the Negro school. The Negro
school buildings are often run down and ill kept, and the amount
22. The Court concluded "that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'sep-
arate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
23. E.g., Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, Report to the Board
of Education of the City of Chicago 46 (1964), where it is reported: he personality
characteristics of the child who has suffered from discrimination, the self-hatred, the
deep sense of frustration, the unexpected aggression, and the consequent difficulty in
relating to others might be expected to have a major effect on his academic achieve-
ment." See also the statistics on the Washington, New York, and Oakland public
schools in U.S. COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 20, at 144-45.
24. Statement Proposed by the New York State Education Commissioner s Advisory
Committee on Human Relations and Community Tensions, June 17, 1963.
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spent to educate the Negro child is, in many cases, substantially less
than that spent on the white.
In addition to these overt differences, Negro children in Negro
schools suffer from lack of exposure to the middle class culture
found in white but not in Negro schools. Shunted off in the slum
school, the Negro child is denied the stimulation of competition
and association with children of other races and cultures. In sum,
whenever a substantial number of Negro children attend public
schools in a given area, it appears that they usually find them-
selves in schools populated primarily by other Negro children; and
these Negro schools somehow usually seem to receive less attention
from the school board in terms of money, teachers, books and
building care. Thus, in most of the school cases arising from
metropolitan areas, it should not be necessary to reach the issue
of whether adventitious de facto segregation, without more, is un-
constitutional. In the New Rochelle case,25 for example, an his-
torical gerrymandering pattern resulting in a primarily Negro school
was found offensive to the equal protection clause. The school
board, of course, defended on the ground that the school in ques-
tion was a neighborhood school and that there was no intention in
fixing the boundaries to limit its attendance to Negroes. The court
was unimpressed with the board's professions of innocent intent.
As a result, Negro children in New Rochelle are now distributed
throughout the school system and a healthy educational situation
obtains in that suburban area.
The Negro plaintiffs, however, were not so fortunate in their
efforts to desegregate the schools in Gary, Indiana, and Kansas City,
Kansas. In spite of admitted substantial segregation of Negro
children and strong proof of historical gerrymandering, inferior
Negro school facilities and inferior Negro faculties in the Negro
schools in those cities, the district courts were unable to find either
inequality or intentional racial segregation. 6 The courts seemed
to be satisfied with the neighborhood school concept of school dis-
tricting, in spite of the fact that the school boards knew when they
drew the boundaries for the Negro schools that those schools would
be racially segregated. And there is no suggestion in either the Gary
or the Kansas City cases that the courts ever heard of the Princeton
25. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940
(1961).
26. Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. dented, 85 Sup"
Ct. 898 (1965); Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), afj'd, 324 F.2d
209 (7th Cir. 1963).
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Plan for ei'ninating de facto segregation which has worked satis-
factorily in that and similar cities for almost a decade. Neither
had they heard of selecting school sites on the dividing line between
white and Negro residential areas so that the schools may serve both
races, nor even of open enrollment, used initially as a corrective in
New Rochelle, which would have allowed children in a segregated
school district to attend a public school of their choice outside that
district.
B. Rational-Relationshzp Doctrine
It seems that the courts in the Gary and Kansas City cases were
more than willing to allow this entire matter to be handled by the
school boards, relying on the boards' judgment and good faith in
spite of a long history of segregated schools in both cities. In both
of these cases, the courts seem to have applied the principle that, as
long as there was a rational relationship between what the school
board did and a legal end to be achieved, the courts' inquiry was
concluded. The courts rejected the suggestion that the end in-
tended was racial segregation, and held that the boards' actions per-
petuating racial segregation were reasonable under the circum-
stances.
It is true, of course, that the Supreme Court in the recent past
has not, in the field of private business and economics, looked be-
hind an action of a state agency as long as the purpose of the agency
in instituting the action was legal and rationally related to that pur-
pose."7 But, as we shall see, the rational-relationship doctrine has
no application to cases involving racial discrimination and public
education. Even if it did, it would be highly questionable whether
permitting segregated Negro schools is rationally related to the edu-
cation of those children who must attend them. 8
(1) Responsibility of the State.-Although the Gary and Kan-
sas City cases both concluded that the federal courts were powerless
with respect to relieving de facto segregation, the issue is far from
dosed. The final word on this subject will, of course, be spoken by
the Supreme Court. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court will
sit idly by for long watching Negro children crowded into inferior
slum schools while the whites flee to the suburbs to place their chil-
27 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)
28. "Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper govern-
mental objective " Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)
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dren in vastly superior predominantly white schools. But before
the Supreme Court acts, some other federal courts29 will no doubt
take a harder look at de facto segregation and will be less inclined
to accept the suggestion that the state and its agencies are not, in
some degree at least, responsible for it and helpless to correct it. Un-
til now, the cases have focused on the school boards' responsibility
in administering the segregated schools, and it is clear that these
agencies, through historical gerrymandering and other devious
means, have contributed to racial imbalance in the schools. But
state action contributing to segregated schools is not limited to school
boards. And the fourteenth amendment speaks to the state itself.3"
As Mr. Justice Brandeis reminds us: "'It is a question of the power
of the State as a whole;' . . the powers of the several state officials
must be treated as if merged in a single officer."'"
Where state policy expressed by its several agencies lends itself
to, and leads toward, segregated schools, the responsibility of the
state is plain. For example, where state policy with reference to
housing, or state encouragement of private racial covenants in hous-
ing, lead to residential segregation and the school board uses the
neighborhood plan in making pupil assignments, the school segrega-
tion that results is dearly the responsibility of the state. Certainly
the state will not be allowed to do in two steps what it may not do
in one. By taking a broader look at state policy and all contributing
state agencies, federal courts may be more successful in finding state
complicity in segregation. Thus, in most cases, where a forthright
effort is made by the courts to determine the cause of racial imbal-
ance, it will be unnecessary to reach the question as to what a state
may do, or must do, to relieve purely adventitious segregation. In
this connection, however, it should be emphasized again that as long
as the federal judges hearing segregation cases, in the North or the
South, are satisfied with the status quo, it will be more difficult for
them to find that racial unbalance in the public schools is not the
result of neutral causes.
29. Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965);
Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Branche v. Board of
Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); indicate that the rationale of the Gary and
Kansas City cases is not acceptable in the District of Massachusetts or in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York. See also Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876,
382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rept. 606 (1963).
30. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hall v. St. Helena Parish
School Bd., 197 . Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961) (per curiam), aff'd, 287 F.2d 376 (5th
Cir. 1961), affd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962) (per curiam)
31. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1931)
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(2) Finding State Acton.-Where a forthright effort is made
to determine the cause of racial imbalance, the probability of find-
ing state action in segregated Negro schools, in some degree at least,
is increased immeasurably Discrimination in job opportunities,
housing, and other necessities drives Negroes into the segregated
slums, and application of the neighborhood school policy seals their
children in the slum school which these children are compelled by
law to attend. Theoretically, the state's compulsory attendance laws
may be satisfied by admission to an accredited private school. Some
white children, of course, do attend private schools. But to the
Negro child the compulsory attendance law often means only one
thing: he must attend the segregated slum school in his neighbor-
hood. This fact alone, the legal compulsion to attend the segregated
school, should be sufficient state action to bring all de facto segre-
gation within the rule of Brown.
State action is also obvious in the use of school boundaries which
inevitably result in a segregated Negro school. When school au-
thorities consciously use school district lines, knowing the result will
be a segregated Negro school, the action and the intention of the
state are clear." Again, the compulsory attendance law, superim-
posed on the school boundary, provides segregation compelled by
law within the rule of Brown.
The argument is made, of course, that, irrespective of the re-
sulting segregation, the action of the school board is rationally re-
lated to the purpose of education and, therefore, courts must ignore
the segregation. But, as already indicated,'3 rational relationship is
not the test of the legality of state action where that action results
in racial segregation. While "normally, the widest discretion is
allowed the legislative judgment in determining whether to attack
some, rather than all, of the manifestations of the evil aimed at; and
normally that judgment is given the benefit of every conceivable cir-
cumstance which might suffice to characterize the classification as
reasonable rather than arbitrary and invidious," 4 state action result-
ing in racial segregation, even though "pursuant to a valid state in-
terest, bears a heavy burden of justification, and will be upheld
only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the ac-
complishment of a permissible state policy.""3
32. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940
(1961) Compare Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
33. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
34. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)
35. Id. at 196.
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In short, where racial segregation results from state action, the
officials responsible therefor must show, not that their action was
only rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, but that there
is no other reasonable way to accomplish that purpose absent racial
segregation. Otherwise, intent to segregate will be inferred. And
whatever arguments there may be in favor of a neighborhood school
policy, no one would seriously suggest that there is no other rational
basis for assigning children to schools.
III. VOLUNTARY STATE ACTION TO ALLEVIATE
RACIAL IMBALANCE
Assuming that in some instances school segregation may be
purely adventitious, the question has arisen as to whether a state
may voluntarily undertake to relieve the racial imbalance. In my
judgment, states may not only take the necessary steps to relieve
adventitious segregation, but, in so doing, may consider race. When
racial imbalance infects a public school system, there is simply no
way to alleviate it without consideration of race. But those who
really, but covertly, want to maintain the segregated status quo cry-
"The Constitution is color-blind." Securely they wrap themselves
in the famous words of Mr. Justice Harlan I, and point to the lan-
guage in Brown 6 indicating that classification on the basis of race
violates the equal protection clause.
Like most aphorisms, Mr. Justice Harlan's felicitous phrase
cannot be taken literally. Certainly the great Justice would be
alarmed if he were aware of the use to which it is presently being
put. The Constitution not only recognizes Negroes as such, but
makes specific provision for their protection in the thirteenth,
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. And the language in Brown
relates to invidious recognition of race for purposes of discrimina-
tion. There is nothing whatever in Brown which suggests that
recognition of race to relieve an inequality violates the fourteenth
amendment. Indeed, as Brown fully recognizes, to relieve an in-
equality with respect to the Negro was, and is, precisely the pur-
pose of the fourteenth amendment.
The suggestion that the state must remain neutral with respect
to race was rejected in The Japanese Relocation Cases" in which,
for national defense purposes, the placing of a burden on a race was
approved. It is strange indeed that this suggestion should be ad-
36. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
37. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayash v. Umted States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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vanced again to prevent the state from relieving a racial inequality
Certainly, there is no constitutional right to have an inequality per-
petuated.
Voluntary action by school authorities seeking to reduce racial
unbalance is easily supported once the "the Constitution is color-
blind" argument is analyzed and answered. In fact, it is difficult to
understand how a court could actually hold that a state may not act to
relieve the inequality caused by de facto segregation; yet several
courts have done precisely that.3" There must be something beguil-
ing about the "color-blind" cliche, particularly to those whose sense
of social and racial justice leaves something to be desired. "The
Constitution is color-blind" is being used by some today the same
way the Court in Plessy v Ferguson 9 used the deceptively simple
"separate but equal" slogan. Bitter experience has shown, however,
that "separate" is never "equal" and that the Constitution, while in
some respects color-blind, is not insensitive to inequality.
Several states, principally New York, New Jersey and California,
have undertaken to reduce the racial unbalance in their schools.4"
This effort, of course, has met with stubborn resistance from those
enjoying the present inequality. Parents of children attending the
pure white, or nearly so, schools have brought law suits in New
York to prevent correction of racial unbalance. After some intial
success at the trial level, the New York Court of Appeals has upheld
the right of the Board of Education to act affirmatively to correct
racial unbalance.4  Thus, as far as New York is concerned, absent
arbitrary action, school authormes have a free hand in eliminating
the inequality of racial segregation in the public schools.
IV AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INTEGRATE
Whether a state can be, and should be, compelled by law to
correct purely adventitious de facto segregation in its public schools
38. See, e.g., Strippoli v. Bickal, 42 Misc. 2d 475, 248 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct.),
rev'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 365, 250 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1964), noted in 16 W RES. L. REv.
788 (1965); In the Matter of Vetere, 41 Misc. 2d 200, 245 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup.
Ct. 1963), modified, 21 App. Div. 2d 561, 251 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1964), Balaban v.
Rubin, 40 Misc. 2d 249, 242 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1963), rev'd, 20 App. Div. 2d
438, 248 N.Y.S.2d 574, affd, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964)
39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
40. The New York and California State Boards of Education require local school
authorities to establish attendance areas for schools which, insofar as practicable, will
avoid racial segregation. The Commissioner of Education of the State of New Jersey
has taken a similar position.
41. Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964)
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admittedly presents serious problems - both legal and practical.
This question also involves the emotional area of state's rights.
How far should the courts go in requiring the states affirmatively
to afford equal opportunity to equal education? Is the enforcement
of this right sufficiently important to risk further assaults on the
federal courts in general and the Supreme Court in particular? If
the Supreme Court does not undertake this burden, at least initially,
by recognizing the constitutional right to equal educational oppor-
tunity, can we confidently assume that the Congress or the states
will protect the Negro in the realization of this right? Perhaps
some background on the importance of public education in this
country may be helpful in answering these questions.
A. The Cartcal Role of Education
The importance of generalized education, at least at the elemen-
tary and high school level, is no new dogma. It is as old as the
theory of popular government. On these shores, it has always been
one of the principal articles of the democratic faith. In 1787, in
the Northwest Ordinance, the Continental Congress declared:
"[Slchools and the means of education shall forever be encour-
aged."" Jefferson termed general education the only "sure foun-
dation . for the preservation of freedom,"43 "without which no
republic can maintain itself in strength."44 Today, all the more,
it remains "the very foundation of good citizenship."45 But, because
our society has grown increasingly complex, education is now also
an economic necessity. "In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education."4 Thus, adequate schooling is no
longer a privilege that can be made available to the few; it is the
indispensable equipment of all men.
The critical role of education in our contemporary society gives
meaning to the associated constitutional rights. But the full im -
portance of the state's obligation to provide equal education cannot
be appreciated without noticing the long and consistent history of
general education as a governmental function.
42. Ordinance of 1787, § 14, art. 3.
43. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Whyte, Aug. 13, 1786, in 5 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 396 (Berg ed. 1907)
44. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler, May 26, 1810, in 12 WRITINGs,
op. cit. supra note 43, at 393.
45. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
46. Ibid.
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Washington,47 Jefferson," Madison,49 and John Adams" all ad-
vocated governmental responsibility in the diffusion of knowledge
through common schools. With such leadership, the public school
movement soon took root so that by 1850 almost every state in the
Union had at least made a start toward a comprehensive system of
education.5 There was then no retreat from the view that education
is a state function. On the contrary, except for the temporary dis-
ruption resulting from the Civil War, the next century is a chro-
nology of progress, studded with important reaffirmations of the doc-
trine. Very soon most of the states solemnly proclaimed a right to
public education in their constitutions. Significantly, the 39th Con-
gress, which drafted the fourteenth amendment, put down public
education as one of the fundamental tenets of republicansm, 52 and
their immediate successors umposed it as a pre-condition to re-admis-
sion of the states still considered in rebellion and to the admission
of new states.5" The full development came with the adoption of
compulsory school attendance laws which necessarily imply free pub-
lic education.
The courts, also, have long characterized education as a function
of the state. As early as 1874, Judge Cooley, whose Constitutzonal
Limitations had appeared in the year of the ratification of the four-
teenth amendment, expressed "no little surprise" that anyone should
question the propriety of the state's furnishing "a liberal education
to the youth of the state in schools brought within the reach of all
classes."54  He "supposed it had always been understood that
education, not merely in the rudiments, but in an enlarged sense,
was regarded as an important practical advantage to be supplied at
their option to rich and poor alike, and not as something pertaining
47 See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Samuel Chase, Jan. 5, 1785, in 28
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 26 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1938)
48. For Jefferson s own summary of his proposed "Bill for the More General Diffu-
sion of Knowledge," see JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 146-49
(Peden ed. 1955).
49. Letter from James Madison to Thomas W Gilmer, Sept. 6, 1830, in THE COM-
PLETE MADISON 314-15 (Padover ed. 1953)
50. See Adams, Dtssertatton on the Canon and the Feudal Law (1765), in 3 WORKS
OF JOHN ADAmS 455-56 (Charles Francis Adams ed. 1851)
51. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 n.4 (1954) and authorities cited
therein.
52. See, e.g., Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866); Act of March
2, 1867, ch. 158, 14 Stat. 434 (1867)
53. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 220-21 & n.9 (1948)
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
54. Stuart v. School Dist. No. 1, 30 Mich. 69, 75 (1874)
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merely to the culture and accomplishment of those whose ac-
cumulated wealth enabled them to pay for it."55 In 1907, the Su-
preme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, recognized that
education is properly considered "one of the first objects of public
care."5 And in 1947, Mr. Justice Black, also for the Supreme
Court, wrote: "It is much too late to argue that legislation intended
to facilitate the opportuity of children to get a secular education
serves no public purpose."57 Now even college training has become
a public concern. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it: "The need for
higher education and the duty of the state to provide it as part of a
public educational system, are part of the democratic faith of most
of our states.""8 The full impact of this development was summed-
up in Brown v, Board of Educ.: ' Today, education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments." 9
B. Segregated Educatton Is Inherently Unequal
From the fact that public education is the states' most impor-
tant function, it does not necessarily follow that segregated public
education, whatever the cause, is illegal. But the importance of
public education. in a democratic society imperatively requires af-
firmative action on the part of the state to assure each child his fair
share, and a child in a segregated Negro school does not receive his
fair share. Public education, once offered by the state, "must be
made available to all on equal terms.""0 And segregated education,
being "inherently unequal," is therefore unconstitutional. 6 '
A racially segregated Negro school is an inferior school. It is
"inherently unequal." 2 No honest person would even suggest, for
example, that the segregated slum school provides educational op-
portumnity equal to that provided by the white suburban public school.
Thus, children compelled by state compulsory attendance laws to
attend the segregated Negro school are deprived of equal protection
of the law. The fact that the classification to attend the school is
55. lbul.
56. Interstate Consol. St. Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907).
57. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
58. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 656 (1943) (dissenting opinion)
59. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
60. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
61. Id. at 495.
62. Ibid.
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based on geography,63 and not on race, does not necessarily make
the school less segregated or less inferior. Nor does it make the
classification less illegal unless it can be shown that no reasonable
classification will alleviate the inequality."4
(1) Equal Protection Requires Equal Educatonal Opportu-
nity,-The touchstone in determining equal protection of the law
in public education is equal educational opportunity, not race. If
classification by race is used to achieve the invidious discrnmination,
the constitutional insult is exacerbated. But the focus must remain
on the result achieved. If the untoward result derives from racial
classification, such classification is per se unconstitutional. Where
the result is segregation, and therefore unequal educational oppor-
tunity, the classification used, whatever it is, is constitutionally sus-
pect and a heavy burden is placed on the school board and the state
to show, not only innocent intent, but also lack of a suitable alterna-
tive.65  In short, since segregation in public schools and unequal
educational opportunity are two sides of the same coin, the state, in
order to provide equal educational opportunity, has the affirmative
constitutional obligation to eliminate segregation, however it arises.
Our experience with the cases involving racial segregation in
Southern schools has blurred the issue presented by de facto segrega-
tion. In the Southern school cases the classification was on the basis
of race. It was this classification that achieved the segregated and
therefore unequal schools. What made the classification invidious,
and therefore unconstitutional, was the inequality it produced. When
the same invidious result is achieved by another classification, that
classification likewise must be tested by the Constitution.
Perhaps the clearest statement of the principle involved in ad-
ventitious de facto segregation has been made by Chief Judge Swee-
ney of the United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts in the only case to date, state or federal, squarely holding that
a state may be required to relieve racial imbalance in the public
schools.6" In ordering the City of Springfield to file a desegregation
plan for its schools by April 3, 1965, Judge Sweeney wrote:
The defendants argue, nevertheless, that there is no consti-
tutional mandate to remedy racial unbalance. But that is not
63. Compare the reapportionment cases: Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964),
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); see
also Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965)
64. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963).
65. McLaughlin v. Florida, supra note 64.
66. Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965)
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the question. The question is whether there is a constitutional
duty to provide equal educational opportunities for all children
within the system. While Brown answered that question affirma-
tively in the context of coerced segregation, the constitutional
fact - the inadequacy of segregated education - is the same in
this case, and I so find. It is neither just nor sensible to proscribe
segregation having its basis in affirmative state action while at the
same time failing to provide a remedy for segregation which grows
out of discrimination in housing, or other economic or social
factors. Education is tax supported and compulsory, and public
school educators, therefore, must deal with inadequacies within
the educational system as they arise, and it matters not that the
inadequacies are not of their making. This is not to imply that
the neighborhood school policy per se is unconstitutional, but
that it must be abandoned or modified when it results in segrega-
tion in fact.67
(2) Constitutional Dimensions.-There can, of course, be no
mathematical formula68 to determine at what point the unequal
educational opportunity inherent in racial imbalance and de facto
school segregation rises to constitutional dimension. A judgment
must be made in each case based on the substantiality of the in-
balance under the particular circumstances. Once substantial racial
imbalance is shown, however, no further proof of unequal educa-
tional opportunity is required. What may be substantial imbalance
in Boston, where the Negro school population is relatively small,
may not be in Washington where the Negro school population is
approaching 90 per cent. Numbers alone do not provide the an-
swer. The relevant population area is an important consideration.
Is the relevant area the city alone or the suburbs as well? A va-
riety of other circumstances may also be important in answering this
sometimes difficult question.
The judicial process is equipped to develop the necessary evi-
dence and to make the judgment as to substantial racial imbalance.
The word "substantial" does not provide a certain or mechanical
guide to decision, but judicial judgments based on similar guides
are made routinely. The test for negligence in every case is whether
the party charged acted "reasonably" or as "the reasonably prudent
person would have acted" under the circumstances. In every jury
case, civil and criminal, the judge decides whether the evidence
against the defendant is "substantial" before he allows the case to
go to the jury. The examples can be multiplied, but the point is
67. Id. at 546.
68. For example, a school, though mathematically racially imbalanced as compared
with other schools in the area, ordinarily would not be racially segregated in the con-
stitutonal sense unless the Negro population of the school out-numbered the white.
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already made. The determination as to substantial racial imbalance,
and therefore unequal educational opportunity, is clearly within
the competence of the judiciary. As in other areas involving due
process and equal protection of the law, the guidelines will have
to be staked out on a case-by-case basis."9 Once substantial racial
imbalance is shown, however, the case for relief is complete and the
burden of going forward with the evidence falls on the state."0
V REMEDIAL ACTION TO CORRECT IMBALANCE
Assuming the constitutional question is answered affirmatively
in favor of the Negro, the question of appropriate remedy arises.
What can a state do - what can a court require a state to do -
to relieve racial unbalance? In short, what, if any, remedies are
available?
A. Current Approaches and Their Limitations
Initially, public school authorities must be cured of the neigh-
borhood school syndrome. The neighborhood school, like the little
red school house, has many emotional ties and practical advantages.
The neighborhood school serves as the neighborhood center, easily
accessible, where children can gather to play on holidays and par-
ents' clubs can meet at any time. But Twentieth Century education
is not necessarily geared to the neighborhood school. In fact, the
trend is definitely in the opposite direction. Educational parks,
each consisting of a complex of schools, science buildings, libraries,
gymnasiums, auditoriums, and playing fields are beginning to re-
place the neighborhood school. Although the development of the
educational park idea in education is unrelated to the question of
racial segregation, its use in relieving racial imbalance in public
schools is obvious. Instead of having neighborhood schools scat-
tered through racially homogeneous residential areas, children of
all races may be brought together in the educational parks.
In many areas where the educational park is not feasible, simple
changes in the existing school district lines may relieve racial im-
balance. For example, the homogeneous character of a school in
a segregated neighborhood may be changed by redrawing its district
lines along with the district lines of the nearest white school so as to
include Negro and white pupils in both schools. Also, under the
69. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877)
70. See note 64 sapra.
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well known Princeton Plan, where the district lines of two racially
diverse schools are contiguous, the racial imbalance can be relieved
by limting the grades in one school from kindergarten to third
and in the other from fourth to sixth. And where new schools are
to be built to accommodate the expanding school population, the
sites for those schools should not be in Negro or white residential
areas, but near the dividing line so that the children living in both
areas may be included in each school district. These plans, alone
or in combination, when properly used, may well suffice to eliminate
the inequality arising from the segregated school in most areas. But
in some sections of our large cities, because of the density of the resi-
dential segregation, Negro schools are back to back. Princeton
Plans and the like are not geared to this problem, but educational
parks do provide the answer to Harlem-type residential situations.
And pending the construction of the educational parks, open en-
rollment may be used as a temporary expedient.
B. Relieving Inequality Between Suburban and City Schools
An even more difficult problem is presented by the flight of the
white population to the suburbs. The pattern is the same all over
the country. The Negro child remains within the political bound-
aries of the city and attends the segregated slum school in his neigh-
borhood, while the white child attends the vastly superior white
public schools in the suburbs. The situation is accurately described
in the 1964 Advisory Panel Report to the Board of Education of
the City of Chicago:
Finally, it cannot be too strongly stressed that programs to
effect school integration must reckon with the fact that the white
elementary school child is already in the minority in the public
schools of Chicago and the tme is not far off when the same will
be true of the white high school student. Unless the exodus of
white population from the public schools and from the City is
brought to a halt or reversed, the question of school integration
may become simply a theoretical matter, as it is already in the
nation's capital. For integration, in fact, cannot be achieved
without white students.71
While a court, in proposing or approving a plan of desegre-
gation, may find no great difficulty in ordering the local school
authorities to use the Princeton Plan, or one of its variants, or, under
the authority of Griffin v. County School Bd..2 in ordering the
71. Advisory Panel, op. cit. su pra note 23, at 12.
72. 377 U.S. 218 (1964)
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local taxing authority or the state to levy taxes to raise funds to
build an educational park, relieving the inequality between the sub-
urban public school and the segregated city slum public school pre-
sents a greater challenge. Obviously, court orders running to local
officials will not reach the suburbs. Nevertheless, when political
lines rather than school district lines shield the inequality, as shown
in the reapportionment cases,7" courts are not helpless to act. The
political thicket, having been pierced to protect the vote,7" can like-
wise be pierced to protect the education of children.
Education, as stated in Brown, is "the most important function
of the state." And, as shown in Hall v St. Helena Parish School
Bd., 5 and Griffin v County School Bd.,7" that important function
must be administered in all parts of the state with an even hand.
The State operates local public schools through its agents, the local
school boards. It directly supplies part of the money for that opera-
tion, it certifies the teachers, it accredits the schools, and, through
its department of education, it maintains constant supervision over
the entire operation. The involvement of the state in the operation
of its public schools is complete. Indeed, the state is the conduit
through which federal money in increasing amounts is being fun-
nelled into the public schools. Certainly federal money may not
be used to indurate an inequality 77 Thus, no state-created political
lines can protect the state against the constitutional command of
equal protection for its citizens, or relieve the state from the obliga-
tion of providing educational opportunities for its Negro slum chil-
dren equal to those provided for its white children in the affluent
suburbs.7"
When the Supreme Court decided the first reapportionment
case, Baker v Carr,7" just as when it decided Brown, it left to the
district courts the task of fashioning the remedy. Undoubtedly, if
and when the Supreme Court tackles the suburban problem vis-4-vis
the city slum school problem, it will again remit the remedy to the
district courts with instructions to ignore the state-created political
73. See note 63 supra.
74. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
75. 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La.) (per curiam), afj'd, 287 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1961),
a!I'd, 368 U.S. 515 (1962) (per curiam)
76. 377 U.S. 218 (1964)
77 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. dened, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
78. See note 63 supra.
79. 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
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lines separating the school boards; and it will make its orders run
directly against state as well as local officials.
VI. THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
I am aware, of course, that what is said here will not find
favor with the advocates of judicial restraint - many of whom
have already expressed the view that de facto segregation is a poli-
tical and social matter which requires a political, not a judicial, so-
lution; that the Congress and the states are equipped to remedy
any inequality which may exist in the public schools, and that any
attempted judicial resolution of the problem would adversely af-
fect the balance of our federalism by trenching on states' rights.
These objections to judicial intervention into de facto segregation
all have a slightly familiar ring. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Brown was subjected to just such criticism. Yet because of that
decision definite progress has been made toward the recognition of
Negro rights. The Court's action unquestionably moved other
branches of government to act. Is there anyone who seriously
thinks that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would be a reality today
without Brown and other Supreme Court decisions exposing racial
injustice? Is it conceivable that the Southern states would have
abolished segregation compelled by law without prodding from the
federal courts?
The reapportionment cases are also in point. Does anyone
really believe that the state legislatures would have reformed them-
selves? Legislators elected via the rotten borough system ordi-
narily would not be expected to vote for its abolition. Perhaps the
reapportionment cases do trench on states' rights, but the people
who now have a full vote are not complaining.
The advocates of judicial restraint have also been critical of
the Supreme Court's work in the field of criminal justice. It is
true that the Court has insisted on civilized procedures in state as
well as federal criminal courts. An accused in a serious criminal
case must now have a lawyer available to represent him, coerced
confessions must be excluded from state and federal criminal trials,
and state as well as federal police must now respect the fourth
amendment. How long should the Supreme Court have waited
for the states to civilize their own criminal procedures before it
undertook to protect the constitutional rights of persons accused of
crime?
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The Supreme Court's intervention into these fields of primary
state responsibility was not precipitous. The states were given
ample opportunity to correct the evils themselves. Before Brown,
the Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions in the field of
education indicating quite clearly that if the states did not act
to eliminate racial segregation compelled by law it would. The
persistence with which reapportionment cases continued to reach
the Supreme Court after it had refused to exercise jurisdiction in
Colegrove v Green,8" should have been warning enough to the
states that one way or the other vote dilution was on the way out.
And civilizing of state criminal procedures under gentle urging
from the Supreme Court has been going on since Brown v Missis-
sippt, 1 where the Court set aside a death sentence based solely on
a confession obtained by hanging the accused from a tree.
There is no indication that the Supreme Court will rush into
the de facto segregation arena. Two circuit courts of appeals 2
have already denied relief from de facto segregation and the Supreme
Court has stayed its hand. But this is no guarantee that the Court
will not act if the problem persists and the states fail to correct the
evil. Proper judicial restraint does not include a failure to act
where a state has abdicated its responsibility to protect the consti-
tutional rights of its citizens.
VII. CONCLUSION
Equal educational opportunity is not the only demand of the
Negro Revolution of the 1960's; it is, however, the most Important
one. Education is the key to social mobility. Without it the Negro
will continue to be tied to the segregated slum where the social, in-
tellectual, and educational damage suffered by his children begins
the day they are born. Repeated studies have confirmed that the
ability of Negro children to learn, given equal conditions, is equal
to the white.' But, by school age, the segregated slum culture in
which they are born and reared has opened an educational gap, as
80. 328 U.S. 549 (1946)
81. 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
82. Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 Sup.
Ct. 898 (1965); Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963)
83. Brief for Appellant, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), in Note, The
Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegraton: A Social Science State-
ment, 37 MINN. L. REV. 427 (1953)
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compared with the white child, which not only is never closed,
but which actually increases as time goes on. 4
It is not enough, therefore, simply to provide equal educational
opportunity beginning at the age of six. Until society eliminates
these segregated slums, cultural and educational enrichment for
slum children must begin at birth. To their great credit, some en-
lightened states, including New York and California, are already
planning just such programs. And the President of the United States
in his recent message on education"5 has asked the Congress for
legislation providing financial aid to states undertaking pre-school
educational programs for slum children.
The American Negro is a totally American responsibility.
Three hundred years ago he was brought to this country by our
forefathers and sold into slavery. One hundred years ago we fought
a war that would set him free. For these last one hundred years
we have lived and professed the hypocrisy that he was free. The
time has now come when we must face up to that responsibility.
Let us erase this blemish - let us remove this injustice - from the
face of America. Let us make the Negro free.
84. Ibnd.
85. 111 CoNG. REc. 499-500 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1965).
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